A Curious Parental Right by Ryznar, Margaret
SMU Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 1 Article 13
2018
A Curious Parental Right
Margaret Ryznar
mryznar@iupui.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. Rev. 127 (2018)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol71/iss1/13
A CURIOUS PARENTAL RIGHT
Margaret Ryznar*
ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court has not articulated the appropriate
level of scrutiny for judicial review of interferences with the parents’ care,
custody, and control of their children, despite determining it to be constitu-
tionally fundamental. While some observers have called for the selection of
a level of scrutiny to prevent inconsistencies among the lower courts, the
complexity of the parental right has made it difficult for courts to use one
level of scrutiny in such cases. To accommodate this complexity, this Arti-
cle begins to build a new framework for conceptualizing the parental right
in a way that explains and justifies using more than one level of scrutiny in
a consistent and predictable way, depending on the specific parental issue
at stake.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, cus-tody, and control of their children (hereinafter parental right) isdeeply rooted and has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court
as a fundamental right.1 Despite lofty language in the case law aiming to
protect this right,2 and despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s usual role of
providing an applicable level of scrutiny,3 the Court has not articulated a
consistent level of scrutiny for judicial review of restrictions on the paren-
tal right.4 It is unclear whether strict scrutiny would apply to such state
interferences,5 and various levels of scrutiny have been applied, depend-
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of
cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[ ] . . .
to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children.”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship be-
tween parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (“[T]he liberty interest in family privacy has its
source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human
rights, as they have been understood in ‘this Nation’s history and tradition.’”) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
2. See infra Part II. “Parental autonomy is protected under the Constitution as a fun-
damental right.” Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 293,
307 (2012). See also Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home:
When Parental Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 73 (2011) (“The
notion of parental autonomy is so deeply embedded in American society that courts have
recognized a constitutionally protected interest in parents’ right to raise children as they
deem appropriate with minimal government interference.”).
3. “[N]ormally, the Supreme Court must provide an applicable standard of review
that governs its disposition of the case.” Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for
Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of
Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2116 (2002) [hereinafter Epitaphios].
4. Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recogniz-
ing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 183,
187 (1996) (“highlight[ing] the disparity that some perceive between the expansive lan-
guage higher courts have used to characterize constitutionally protected parental rights
and the lack of deference many lower courts actually show when applying parental rights
within specific fact settings”). Normally,
[w]hen the right infringed is “fundamental,” the governmental regulation
must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Rights are
fundamental when they are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” or
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Where the claimed
right is not fundamental, the governmental regulation need only be reasona-
bly related to a legitimate state objective.
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, S. 984 (104th Congress), which was
never enacted, would have codified the parental right and protected it from government
interference without compelling justification. For background, see Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act
and the Politics of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1996).
5. “The Supreme Court, however, has never expressly indicated whether this ‘paren-
tal right,’ when properly invoked against a state regulation, is fundamental, deserving strict
scrutiny, or earns only a rational basis review.” Immediato, 73 F.3d at 461. “One thing is
clear: the majority of Justices past and present agree emphatically that the Due Process
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ing on the specific parental issue at stake.6 As a result, the lower courts,
in addition to parents and states, have been uncertain about the strength
and contours of the parental right for decades.7
The problems created by a lack of an articulated level of scrutiny are
not merely academic,8 as illustrated by Troxel v. Granville, wherein the
parental care, custody, and control of children was reaffirmed without
mention of a level of scrutiny.9 After the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down Washington state’s third-party visitation statute, state legislators
around the country rushed to rewrite their own grandparent visitation
statutes, which were then challenged in state courts that did not have gui-
dance on the appropriate level of scrutiny.10 Ultimately, the U.S. Su-
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees parents a right to the care, custody, and
control of their children. The clarity ends there. The Court has left open for debate the
nature of the right, the appropriate standard of review, and which state interests allow for a
decision against a parent’s wishes for his or her child.” Kristen H. Fowler, Constitutional
Challenges to Indiana’s Third-Party Custody Statutes, 82 IND. L.J. 499, 507 (2007) (footnote
omitted); see also Nicole Thieneman Maddox, Silencing Students’ Cell Phones Beyond the
Schoolhouse Gate: Do Public Schools’ Cell Phone Confiscation and Retention Policies Vio-
late Parents’ Due Process Rights?, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 261, 267 (2012) (“Thus, courts have not
consistently applied strict scrutiny analysis to cases involving parental rights throughout
the history of due process jurisprudence. Even after the Supreme Court’s announcement of
parents’ rights to manage their children as fundamental, the question of the appropriate
standard of review for a state’s justified intrusion remains unclear. The Supreme Court has
not announced a consistent standard to be applied in cases addressing this issue.”) (foot-
notes omitted).
6. Most commonly, either strict scrutiny or rational basis review is applied in substan-
tive due process cases. See Kelly A. Spencer, Note, Sex Offenders and the City: Ban Orders,
Freedom of Movement, and Doe v. City of Lafayette, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 297, 302
(2002). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also used other levels of scrutiny in such
cases. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 210, 210–11
(1992) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. See also infra Part II. This Article neither challenges
nor defends applying the current framework of hierarchical tiers of judicial scrutiny to
parental right cases, but works within it.
7. “American common law gives parents the primary right to govern their children’s
activity, but specific issues of statewide importance are resolved by statute.” Sy Moskowitz,
American Youth in the Workplace: Legal Aberration, Failed Social Policy, 67 ALB. L. REV.
1071, 1081 (2004) (footnote omitted).
8. Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1579, 1586 (2017) (“Scholars have long noted that the level of scrutiny is often dispositive
in equal protection cases. This is particularly true in gay rights litigation.”).
9. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).
10. See Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts
and Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV. 927, 929 (2009) (reviewing state cases triggered by
Troxel). For example, Indiana Code 31-17-5-1 on grandparent visitation survived constitu-
tional challenge in Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to
apply strict scrutiny). Other courts used different levels of scrutiny in reviewing their
state’s grandparent visitation statute. See, e.g., In re L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So. 2d 178, 184
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (applying strict scrutiny in the grandparent visitation context); Jack-
son v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100, 106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to apply strict scrutiny
because “only Justice Thomas would have applied strict scrutiny to the statute in Troxel”
and “Troxel dealt with grandparents’ visitation imposed by a court on the natural mother
of a child born out of wedlock who wanted to restrict it but not deny it”); Sightes v. Barker,
684 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the Grandparent Visitation Act constitu-
tional even under strict scrutiny); In re Guardianship of Blair, No. 01-1565, 2003 WL
182981, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003) (upholding a grandparent visitation law de-
spite applying strict scrutiny); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Mass. 2002) (applying
strict scrutiny to grandparent visitation statute); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 300
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preme Court did not grant certiorari to clarify grandparent visitation,
leaving much uncertainty and litigation at the lower courts.11 The result
was that Troxel “led to an avalanche of state court litigation over the
constitutionality of child custody and visitation laws,”12 yielding unpre-
dictability and inconsistency in this area of family law.13
A uniform or predictable level of scrutiny in parental right cases will
not appear without being addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. On the
contrary, selecting a level of scrutiny grows more complicated as courts
encounter a wider range of parental right cases and as states regulate
more on issues implicating parents.14 Given that one role of the Supreme
Court is to clarify the law,15 the Court should not get accustomed to leav-
ing the levels of scrutiny in family law cases unclear.16
Other constitutional and family law issues also lack guidance on the
appropriate level of scrutiny from the U.S. Supreme Court.17 For exam-
ple, the Court’s omission of a level of scrutiny in Obergefell left observers
wondering what level of scrutiny applies to state interferences with same-
(Me. 2000) (analyzing grandparent visitation act using strict scrutiny); Fausey v. Hiller, 851
A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (upholding a grandparent visitation statute under strict
scrutiny).
11. “While many scholars have offered suggestions in the past to repair the problems
created in the Troxel decision, no one has proposed a uniform solution—a law which all
states may use as guidance in redrafting their own third-party visitation statutes.” Garza,
supra note 10, at 929.
12. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 864 n.324 (2006) [hereinafter Fatal in
Theory]. “Parental rights cases typically arise in state courts. . . . In scores of decisions the
state courts have upheld laws despite applying strict scrutiny.” Id.
13. Other commentators have similarly expressed concern about the lack of guidance
for the “lower courts adjudicating and litigants advancing substantive due process claims.”
Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 211. “[T]he Court has neither adhered in practice to its
formal framework for analyzing substantive due process claims nor applied a coherent
standard of scrutiny in its departures.” Id.
14. See infra Part III.
15. “One of the Supreme Court’s roles is to interpret the Constitution and develop
constitutional law, rules, tests, and doctrines that will ensure its implementation.” Maureen
N. Armour, Federal Courts as Constitutional Laboratories: The Rat’s Point of View, 57
DRAKE L. REV. 135, 149 (2008).
16. “[N]ormally, the Supreme Court must provide an applicable standard of review
that governs its disposition of the case.” Krotoszynski, Epitaphios, supra note 3, at 2116.
But see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 1004 n.405 (2006) [hereinafter Dumbo’s Feather] (noting the
cases in which “the [U.S.] Supreme Court has been less emphatic about the appropriate
standard of review”); MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DE-
FENSES §3.05 (4th ed. 2017-2 supp.) (“The Troxel Court’s reluctance to articulate a defini-
tive standard of judicial review, and the plurality’s decision to limit its decision to holding
Washington’s visitation policy unconstitutional only as applied rather than facially, are
somewhat understandable. After all, the constitutional right of parents to custody, care,
and control of their children clashes with the notion that family law is overwhelmingly a
matter of state concern and governed by state law rather than constitutional law.”).
17. For example, the key Second Amendment gun possession cases have avoided spec-
ifying a level of scrutiny, but have noted several specific contexts in which the right can be
limited or overridden. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Mc-
Donald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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sex marriage and other family law rights.18 This is an issue not only for
such recent cases, but also for the oldest, such as those related to the
parental right to the care, custody, and control of children.19
There may be various reasons for the lack of guidance on the level of
scrutiny in parental right cases. They range from the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to create or expand rights under the Due Process Clause, to an
intentional decision of the Court to leave the scope of the fundamental
right of parenting undefined, to the doctrine of abstention.20
This Article focuses on another potential reason for the lack of a level
of scrutiny not sufficiently explored in the literature—the difficulty of
taking a narrow approach to a broad question. In other words, the reason
that nearly one hundred years have passed without a level of scrutiny
may be the complexity of the right to the care, custody, and control of a
child.
Many features of the parental right make it uniquely complex. It is dif-
ficult to set one level of scrutiny for different issues that variously burden
the essence of parenthood, ranging from student uniforms in public
schools to removal of children from their home.21 Additionally, the pa-
rental right spans both the private and public arenas, with parenting roles
in the home and in the public arena, such as schools. The parental right
might also conflict with the child’s best interests, or those of other chil-
dren, such as in the vaccination context.22 Finally, the U.S. Supreme
Court often considers the parental right in conjunction with other consti-
tutional rights, complicating the context.23
This high level of complexity for a constitutional right makes a single
and static rule or approach difficult, which is seen in the diverse variety of
approaches used by the lower courts.24 However, various levels of scru-
18. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). “While Obergefell made no refer-
ence to standard of review, did it nevertheless plant the seeds for heightening scrutiny for
purposes of equal protection analysis at a later point? . . . These kinds of basic doctrinal
questions about how Obergefell will play out in future cases are intensified by a striking
fact: the majority opinion was written by the same justice who wrote every other Four-
teenth Amendment opinion on lesbian and gay rights.” Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audi-
ences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1016 (2016).
19. Garza, supra note 10, at 927 (noting that the parental right is the oldest recognized
fundamental right).
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (“So long as certain minimum require-
ments of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests
of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves.”);
see also Margaret Ryznar, Note, Adult Rights as the Achilles’ Heel of the Best Interests
Standard: Lessons in Family Law from Across the Pond, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1649,
1659 (2007).
23. See, e.g., Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From
Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 73 (2006) (“Notwith-
standing Meyer’s reputation as a parental rights case, in this article I demonstrate that, in
fact, the use of Meyer in support of a substantive due process liberty right of parents qua
parents is sporadic and often is joined with other constitutional claims.”); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (considering free exercise and the parental right).
24. See infra Part II.
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tiny have been used in parental right cases25 without much method, logic,
or reason.26 This Article begins to establish a framework through which
to select an appropriate level of scrutiny for state interferences with the
parental right.27
This Article proposes to do so through two models of conceptualizing
the parental right. The first model is a sliding scale, which adjusts the
level of scrutiny depending on the issue’s closeness to the core of
parenthood. The second model is the bundle of rights, which would assign
a particular level of scrutiny to each right in the bundle. While the sliding
scale model has the virtue of relative flexibility and similarity to the cur-
rent approach when compared to the bundle of rights model, both re-
quire looking at the different functions of parenthood, defining them, and
taking a nuanced approach to setting the appropriate level of scrutiny,
which is dynamic and changes according to the parental issue at stake.
Utilizing the resulting framework will result in more predictability and
consistency in selecting a level of scrutiny in parental right cases, as well
as judicial efficiency.28 Furthermore, a formal framework would aim to
better protect the parental right as compared to the current lack of con-
sistency in selecting a level of scrutiny, which may fail to protect the con-
stitutional right of parents.29 Finally, such a framework is consistent with
previous constitutional law proposals, such as Justice Stephen Breyer’s
interest-balancing approach30 and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s sliding
scale approach to equal protection.31 The parental right is uniquely well-
25. “Constitutional adjudication through one or more levels, or hierarchical tiers, of
judicial scrutiny is entirely familiar. For example, one or more varieties of tiered scrutiny
typically appear in adjudication involving equal protection, freedom of speech, the free
exercise of religion, substantive due process, the Second Amendment, and even in adjudi-
cating the exercise of enumerated congressional powers.” R. George Wright, What If All
the Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV.
165, 165–66 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
26. See infra Part II.
27. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 747, 760 (2017) (noting arbitrary decision-making and Justice Scalia’s position that
“more ‘general traditions’—such as parental or family rights—’provide[d] such imprecise
guidance, they [would] permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views.’”)
(alterations in original) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989)).
28. See, e.g., Edgardo Buscaglia & Thomas Ulen, A Quantitative Assessment of the
Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 275, 282
(1997) (measuring judicial efficiency as case “clearance rates and times-to-disposition”).
29. For example, courts can arbitrarily decide to exclude certain issues from the paren-
tal right, and they do. See infra Part II, notes 65–67, 77 and accompanying text. “If a court
determines that a parent’s rights do not encompass a particular concern, the standard of
review it would have applied to a violation of such rights is irrelevant.” Eric A. DeGroff,
Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozert After 20 Years, 38 J.L. &
EDUC. 83, 103 (2009).
30. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
31. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I have long believed the level of
scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of
the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.’”) (citations omitted).
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situated for these types of flexible approaches that change based on the
parental issue at stake.
This Article begins developing the framework for selecting a level of
scrutiny for judicial review in parental right cases. Part II starts by explor-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings on the parental right and the lower
courts’ interpretations of it, highlighting the confusion caused by the lack
of a consistent level of scrutiny. Part III explores two new ways of con-
ceptualizing the parental right, both of which explain and justify using
different levels of scrutiny by debundling the parental right into its com-
ponent parts. This Part concludes by offering a framework through which
to select the appropriate level of scrutiny in parental right cases, which
will have the benefit of introducing consistency and predictability to this
area of family law.
II. CURRENT LEGAL BACKGROUND
The law on the parental right to the care, custody, and control of a
child has developed over decades. The language from the U.S. Supreme
Court is clear on protecting a parent’s right to the care, custody, and con-
trol of a child; but without an articulated level of scrutiny, the lower
courts are not cohesive.32
A. U.S. SUPREME COURT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The parental right has a long history in the case law of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, with the Court declining to select a level of scrutiny despite
many opportunities to do so.33 Thus, the Court’s consideration of the pa-
rental right on many occasions has not yielded a consistent level of scru-
tiny or a consistent approach to selecting the level of scrutiny.
Some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence predates the current
constitutional analytic framework of the various levels of scrutiny,34 but a
recent Court case highlights the problem created by the lack of a level of
scrutiny in parental right cases since then. In Troxel, the paternal grand-
parents of children wanted more significant visitation than the mother
allowed.35 The lower court granted such visitation under a Washington
statute that allowed the petition for visitation with a child by anyone at
any time. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the parental right
prevents a third party from being able to petition for visitation at any
time, resting its reasoning on the parent’s right to the care, custody, and
control of children as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
32. This is also seen in other constitutional areas left without an articulated level of
scrutiny, such as gun possession cases. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in
the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 737 (2012);
supra note 18.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. DeGroff, supra note 29, at 100–101.
35. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000); see supra Part I.
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to the U.S. Constitution.36
The language of the Troxel plurality established the importance of this
parental right, but failed to articulate a level of scrutiny.37 There was not
even a majority opinion to clarify the approach to the parental right, only
a plurality.38 Other ambiguities in the decision resulted in unclear man-
dates to the state legislatures and to the courts reviewing post-Troxel
statutes.39
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Troxel highlighted the ensu-
ing disagreement on the appropriate level of scrutiny in cases on the par-
ent’s care, custody, and control of a child. In his short concurrence,
Justice Thomas not only wrote in favor of articulating a level of scrutiny,
but also suggested strict scrutiny: “I agree with the plurality that this
Court’s recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the up-
bringing of their children resolves this case. . . . I would apply strict scru-
tiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”40
Meanwhile, in his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that “[o]nly three hold-
ings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitu-
tional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children—two of
them from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since
36. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, we held that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right
of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and ‘to control the education of their
own.’ Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, we again held that the ‘liberty of
parents and guardians’ includes the right ‘to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control.’ We explained in Pierce that ‘[t]he child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.’ We returned to the
subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, and again confirmed that there is a constitutional di-
mension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. ‘It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.’”) (citations omitted).
37. See id. See also JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RE-
SPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISMENT OF THE CHILD 126 (2014); Kristina Thomas
Whiteaker, Note, West Virginia Takes Refuge in Troxel’s Safe Harbor: State ex rel. Bran-
don L. v. Moats, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 556 (2003).
38. “[A] plurality, rather than a majority opinion would be another measure of the
strength of reasoning.” Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to
Depart (or Not) from Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1139 n.122 (2015).
39. See supra Part I.
40. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). “Although Justice Thomas would
apply a strict scrutiny standard of review to infringements of a parent’s fundamental right,
the rest of the Court was notably silent on this issue.” Daniel R. Victor & Keri L. Middle-
ditch, Grandparent Visitation: A Survey of History, Jurisprudence, and Legislative Trends
Across the United States in the Past Decade, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 391, 401 n.33
(2009). See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion) (explaining “heightened protec-
tion [for] . . . certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” before describing the paren-
tal interest in the care, custody, and control of children as a “fundamental liberty
interest”).
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been repudiated.”41 He concluded that “the theory of unenumerated pa-
rental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis
protection,”42 but none of them offered a level of scrutiny for the sub-
stantive due process right that parents enjoy.
Meyer v. Nebraska stood for the proposition that there is a substantive
constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.43
At issue in the case was a Nebraska law enacted after World War I that
prevented the teaching of any modern language other than English to any
child who had not successfully passed the eighth grade.44 Under the law, a
teacher was convicted for teaching German to a ten-year-old child in
school.
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Nebraska law on substantive
due process grounds.45 The Court determined that the property element
in the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the teacher’s right to earn a
living, and the liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment included the
right of parents to engage him to instruct their children. Specifically, the
liberty interest included the right of parents to control the education of
their children. The Court concluded that the law did not rationally relate
to the state’s objectives. This is the very foundation for expanding the
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and for applying it to fam-
ily law issues.
Meanwhile, at issue in Pierce v. Society of Sisters46 was the decision of
Oregon voters that all students between eight and sixteen years of age
41. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia cites
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391, 401 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972).
42. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A legal principle that can be thought
to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is not a legal
principle that has induced substantial reliance. While I would not now overrule those ear-
lier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I extend the theory upon which they
rested to this new context.”). Nonetheless, the Troxel plurality noted, “[W]e have recog-
nized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children.” Id. at 66 (plurality opinion) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (noting “the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for
the nurture and upbringing of their children.”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent
and child is constitutionally protected.”); and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
(“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as
a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.”)).
43. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
44. “One of the most remarkable things about the Supreme Court’s decisions concern-
ing free speech in schools is how much each of the cases has reflected important issues and
trends of its day. Each case is like a time capsule capturing something significant about the
era in which it arose. Fear of radical foreign influences during the Red Scare following the
first World War led to Meyer v. Nebraska, where the Court struck down a Nebraska law
prohibiting schools from teaching foreign languages to children until after the eighth
grade.” Allen Rostron, Intellectual Seriousness and the First Amendment’s Protection of
Free Speech for Students, 81 UMKC L. REV. 635, 636–37 (2013) (footnote omitted).
45. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
46. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
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would be required to attend public schools only, not private ones, in or-
der to promote a common American culture following World War I.47
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down this state law on substantive due
process grounds.48 Although the decision protects the schools’ economic
rights as part of the property element in the Due Process Clause, its lan-
guage also provides a foundation for a rule that presumptively keeps the
state out of some family choices. The Court additionally emphasized the
right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of the children
under their control, concluding that the law did not rationally relate to
the state’s objectives.49 The Court interpreted the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause to encompass parental autonomy to rear a child as
the parent sees fit.50 Thus, this case served as the foundation of the con-
stitutional right of parental autonomy.
Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
refusal of several Amish parents to send their children to public school
after the eighth grade despite a Wisconsin law requiring all children to
attend public school until the age of sixteen.51 The parents argued that
high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs, and they
won in the U.S. Supreme Court.52
In the case, the Supreme Court wrote in lofty language about the pa-
rental right, noting:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as con-
trasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and educa-
tion of their children. The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and up-
bringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition.53
47. Id. at 530.
48. Id. at 534–35.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 535.
51. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08 (1972).
52. Id. at 209, 234.
53. Id. at 232. The Court added:
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some pur-
pose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power
of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 233 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, in his concur-
rence, Justice White wrote:
Pierce v. Society of Sisters lends no support to the contention that parents
may replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic
views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member
of society; in Pierce, both the parochial and military schools were in compli-
ance with all the educational standards that the State had set, and the Court
held simply that while a State may posit such standards, it may not pre-empt
the educational process by requiring children to attend public schools. . . . A
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The Supreme Court determined that “[w]hen balancing the free exer-
cise claims of the parents against the state’s interest, courts must apply
heightened scrutiny.”54 As to the “fundamental interest of parents, as
contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and educa-
tion of their children . . . [t]he history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbring-
ing of their children.”55
In light of this precedent, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects parents in making decisions regarding the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children. Additional U.S. Supreme Court cases
continued to use this language as well.56 However, the lack of a level of
scrutiny in such cases has been confusing the lower courts for years, re-
sulting in their use of various levels of scrutiny when reviewing state in-
terferences with the parental right.57
B. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s lack of an articulated level of scru-
tiny, the lower courts have also been inconsistent when considering pa-
rental right cases.58 The wide range of parental matters at stake also
State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent tal-
ents of its children but also in seeking to prepare them for the life style that
they may later choose, or at least to provide them with an option other than
the life they have led in the past.
Id. at 239–40 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
54. Jennifer Ann Drobac, For the Sake of the Children: Court Consideration of Relig-
ion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1609, 1615 (1998).
55. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
56. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and
to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), ‘basic civil rights of man,’ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and
‘[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,’ May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533
(1953).”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–24 (1989) (“This insistence that the
asserted liberty interest be rooted in history and tradition is evident, as elsewhere, in our
cases according constitutional protection to certain parental rights.”).
57. See, e.g., John M. Lewis, Re-Evaluating Grandparental Visitation in North Carolina
in Light of Troxel v. Granville, 23 CAMPBELL L. REV. 249, 254 n.39 (2001) (noting two state
supreme courts’ interpretations of the parental right). “Consequently, federal circuits have
split regarding the boundaries of parental rights, with some circuits adopting the traditional
view of the Meyer-Pierce right and others finding that parental rights terminate upon the
choice to send a child to a public school rather than a private school.” Lauren Vanga,
Comment, Ending Bullying at a Price?: Why Social Conservatives Fear Legislatively Man-
dated LGBT Indoctrination in Schools, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 659, 669 (2014).
58. “In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower federal and
state courts inevitably have split on the matter. The Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, as well as state courts in Washington, Ohio, Massachusetts and New York, have
expressly classified parental interests as fundamental or have applied strict scrutiny in re-
viewing alleged violations. Other courts, including the Michigan Supreme Court, have ex-
plicitly stated that ‘parents do not have a constitutional right [to direct their children’s
education] requiring strict scrutiny.’ Somewhere in the middle, perhaps, is the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which recently affirmed parental rights as fundamental but applied a
rational basis test to the question of mandatory school uniforms. Similarly, the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire appears to have employed a type
of relaxed strict scrutiny in denying plaintiffs’ right to have their children removed from
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contributes to divergent approaches.59 The result is that the lower courts
use various levels of scrutiny when considering state interferences with
the parental right.60 The courts have also carved out certain issues from
the parental right without offering a method for doing so.
There have been many instances of the courts using rational basis in
these cases. For example, the Second Circuit has applied rational basis in
several instances. In one case, a public high school student and his par-
ents brought an action against the school district alleging that its
mandatory community service program violated their due process
rights.61 According to the court, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has never ex-
pressly indicated whether this ‘parental right,’ when properly invoked
against a state regulation, is fundamental, deserving strict scrutiny, or
earns only a rational basis review. Our reading of the appropriate caselaw
convinces us that rational basis review is appropriate.”62 In so concluding,
the Second Circuit relied on several decisions from other circuits applying
rational basis review in cases involving parental control of a child. The
court determined that since the program was rationally related to the le-
gitimate state interest of education, it was constitutionally valid.
In another such case, the Second Circuit defined the parental right as
excluding the parental choices at issue.63 In the case, the father argued
that “his constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of his
child require[d] the [public school] . . . to excuse his minor son . . . from
attending health education classes.”64 Citing Troxel, the father argued
that his Fourteenth Amendment fundamental liberty interest had been
violated and thus strict scrutiny was the proper level of scrutiny. The Sec-
ond Circuit rejected his argument and applied rational basis review to
uphold the school’s curriculum. It reasoned that the father lacked a fun-
damental right to tell public schools what to teach and, based on its previ-
ous jurisprudence, concluded that rational basis review was appropriate
because the father had attempted to exempt his child from an educational
requirement: “Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do not begin to suggest
the existence of a fundamental right of every parent to tell a public school
what his or her child will and will not be taught.”65 Thus, the Second
Circuit narrowly interpreted the parental right to exclude the parental
issue at stake.
The First Circuit similarly distinguished Troxel from the facts before it
in Parker v. Hurley.66 Specifically, “[t]he First Circuit narrowly defined
activities in the public schools that offended their religion.” DeGroff, supra note 29, at
101–02 (alterations and emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
59. See supra Part II.B.
60. Id.
61. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 1996).
62. Id. at 461.
63. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2003).
64. Id. at 135.
65. Id. at 141.
66. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 101 (1st Cir. 2013). Charles J. Russo, “The Child is
Not the Mere Creature of the State:” Controversy Over Teaching About Same-Sex Marriage
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the parents’ due process rights with regard to their children’s educa-
tion”67 so as to evade implicating the parental right and considering strict
scrutiny.
Meanwhile, in the Fourth Circuit, students and parents brought an ac-
tion challenging a school district’s mandatory community service pro-
gram.68 The Fourth Circuit held that although the Meyer and Pierce
decisions used the language of rational basis review, the two decisions
alone were not dispositive, as they did not use the modern framework of
scrutiny. However, the Fourth Circuit explained that the line of cases be-
ginning with Meyer up to the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Runyon
consistently held that reasonable regulation by the state was permissible
even when conflicting with the parental liberty interest. The court
equated this language to rational basis review and held that the school
district had a legitimate interest in teaching students the value of
service.69
The Fifth Circuit also applied rational basis review to a school’s
mandatory uniform policy.70 The parents argued that the policy violated
their fundamental right to control their children’s education and that
strict scrutiny was the appropriate level of scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit re-
jected the parents’ argument and applied rational basis review to uphold
the statute, reasoning that Troxel did not cover a school uniform policy as
the “parental right [is] not absolute in the public school context and can
be subject to reasonable regulation.” Citing Meyer and Pierce, the Fifth
Circuit further reasoned that its decision “follow[ed] almost eighty years
of precedent analyzing [the] parental right[ ] in the context of public edu-
cation under a rational-basis standard.”71
The Sixth Circuit applied rational basis review when the father of a
middle school student challenged the school’s dress code as a violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to control the education of
in Public Schools, 232 W. ED. L. REP. 1, 8 (2008) (“As to the parents’ due process and free
exercise claims, the court rejected their reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in
Troxel v. Granville (Troxel) in defense of their right ‘to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.’ The First Circuit distinguished the plurality in
Troxel on the bases that the Supreme Court’s analysis dealt with cases involving child cus-
tody and the fundamental control of the education of their children as in Yoder. Addition-
ally, the court interpreted Troxel as not addressing the standard of review in due process
cases.”). See also Timothy Brandon Waddell, Note, Bringing It All Back Home: Establish-
ing a Coherent Constitutional Framework for the Re-Regulation of Homeschooling, 63
VAND. L. REV. 541, 573 (2010) (“In defining the scope of the parental due process right to
direct the education of one’s children to exclude homeschooling decisions or in applying a
standard of review different than that normally applied to violations of fundamental rights,
courts have taken several doctrinally troubling steps.”).
67. Amy Lai, Tango or More? From California’s Lesson 9 to the Constitutionality of a
Gay-Friendly Curriculum in Public Elementary Schools, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 315, 321
(2011) (“The First Circuit narrowly defined the parents’ due process rights with regard to
their children’s education.”).
68. Herndon by Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 176
(4th Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 179.
70. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 289.
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his child.72 In rejecting the father’s claim, the Sixth Circuit held that
“[w]hile parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send
their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right gener-
ally to direct how a public school teaches their child” as these issues are
committed to the control of state and local authorities. Furthermore, the
court concluded that the father fell far short of showing that the dress
code failed to satisfy rational basis review.73
In the Seventh Circuit, a private religious school brought an action
challenging a high school association’s bylaw that made a transferring stu-
dent eligible for athletics only if the transfer was from a private to a pub-
lic school.74 The Seventh Circuit rejected the school’s argument that the
transfer rule burdened the fundamental right of parents to direct the edu-
cation of their children. The court explained that rational basis review,
rather than strict scrutiny, was the appropriate level of scrutiny and up-
held the transfer policy.75
In the Ninth Circuit, parents “alleged . . . that the school district vio-
lated their fundamental right ‘to control the upbringing of their children’
. . . by administering a psychological assessment questionnaire containing
several questions that referred to subjects of a sexual nature.”76 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the parents’ argument and held that although the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protected their right to con-
trol their children’s upbringing, it did not include the right to direct how a
public school teaches their child. Thus, rational basis review was appro-
priate.77 Once again, to avoid any heightened review, a court excluded
the parental issue in the case from the parental right.
The district courts have similarly often applied rational basis review
when considering state restrictions on the parental right. For example, the
parents of middle school students challenged the validity of a school pol-
icy requiring students to wear uniforms.78 The federal district court held
that the parents did not have a fundamental right to direct the dress code
or uniform policy at the school and that rational basis review was appro-
priate. To support its decision, the court reasoned that the policy was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose in the school’s effort
to improve student discipline, academic performance, and gang-related
activity.79
Federal lower courts have also discussed applying intermediate scrutiny
to infringements on the parental right. For example, in one case, a group
of parents sought to enjoin enforcement of a juvenile curfew law.80 The
72. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 396 (6th Cir. 2005).
73. Id.
74. Griffin High Sch. v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 674.
76. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
77. Id.
78. Derry v. Marion Cmty. Sch., 790 F. Supp. 2d 839, 842 (N.D. Ind. 2008).
79. Id. at 851.
80. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc). See
also Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998), for another cur-
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court explained that the fundamental parental right focuses on the par-
ents’ control of the home and formal education of their children, but does
not include a parent’s ability to unilaterally determine when and if chil-
dren will be on the streets, especially at night. According to the court,
even if the right involved was fundamental in nature, the appropriate
level of scrutiny was intermediate.81
In another case, parents challenged a local ordinance that required a
license for door-to-door solicitation of donations and prohibited those
under sixteen years old from any such solicitation without being accom-
panied by a parent or legal guardian, arguing that it violated their Four-
teenth Amendment right to the care, custody, and control of their
children.82 Citing Troxel, Meyer, and Pierce, the court recognized that
parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their
children. Given the ordinance’s restriction on the parents’ right to allow
their children to move freely at night, the court reasoned that intermedi-
ate scrutiny was proper, but the constitutionality of the ordinance could
not be determined at that time.
In a few cases, however, federal courts have applied strict scrutiny to
infringements on the parental right. For example, in one case, parents
argued that the state statute mandating that students recite the Pledge of
Allegiance or the national anthem each morning violated their Four-
teenth Amendment rights.83 The court agreed with the parents and ap-
plied strict scrutiny in holding that the statute was unconstitutional.
Citing Meyer, Pierce, and Troxel, the court reasoned that parents had a
fundamental liberty interest in directing the upbringing and care of their
children.84 Following Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Troxel, the court
determined that strict scrutiny was the proper level of scrutiny given the
fundamental right at issue.
In another case, the Ninth Circuit considered a curfew.85 The court ad-
dressed the parental right, stating that
[t]he right to rear children without undue governmental interference
is a fundamental component of due process. Substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment “forbids the government to in-
fringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what
few case in which the court rejected the parents’ fundamental right argument under Yoder,
Stanley, and Meyer, but settled on intermediate scrutiny.
81. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 531.
82. New York Youth Club v. Town of Smithtown, 867 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (E.D.N.Y.
2012).
83. Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d in part sub nom.
Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004). However, the Third Circuit declined to
address the Fourteenth Amendment issue in its decision in Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d
172, 183 (3d Cir. 2004).
84. “Subsequently, courts around the country, including the courts of the states sur-
veyed here, have cited Troxel for the proposition first set forth in Meyer v. Nebraska over
eighty years ago: Parents have a fundamental right to control the care and custody of their
children.” Eve Stotland & Cynthia Godsoe, The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting
Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 9 (2006).
85. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1997).
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process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.”86
Thus, the lower courts have differed in their approaches in the absence
of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. The level of scrutiny applied
by the lower courts links to their understanding of the parental right,
which differs across courts. They have also addressed various parenting
issues in their cases, which contributes to the differing levels of scrutiny.
On occasion, they have even rejected that the parental right encompassed
a particular parental issue, without much explanation.
To increase consistency among the lower courts, some observers have
urged the U.S. Supreme Court to simply state a level of scrutiny. Yet,
there has been no agreement about which level is appropriate, and vari-
ous levels have been used in state interferences with the parental right.
There is a way, however, to explain and justify the current use of different
levels of scrutiny for the parental right while still clarifying the law to
make it more predictable and consistent.
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING THE LEVEL OF
SCRUTINY
There may be various reasons for the lack of a consistent level of scru-
tiny in parental right cases, but an undertheorized one is that the parental
right is too complex and spans too many different issues that variously
burden the essence of parenthood to have one level of scrutiny. If the
complexity of the parental right is the obstacle to articulating a single
level of scrutiny in parental right cases,87 this Article proposes two new
models through which to view the parental right in order to facilitate gui-
dance on the appropriate level of scrutiny, which can be dynamic and
change according to the parental issue at stake. The first is to use a sliding
scale to determine the level of scrutiny based on the burden of the chal-
lenged state interference on the essence of parenthood. The second is to
break down the parental right into its component parts and select a
nuanced level of scrutiny for each depending on the weight of the paren-
tal interest involved.
A. LACK OF A CONSISTENT LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
There may be several different reasons for the lack of a consistent level
of scrutiny in parental right cases. They range from the U.S. Supreme
86. Id. at 951–52 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
87. See Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recog-
nizing a Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 BYU L. REV. 183,
189 (1996) (explaining “three independent interpretive theories of the Ninth Amendment
that have been used by parental rights advocates in support of a fundamental right to
direct the upbringing of a child: natural law theory, original intent interpretation, and pub-
lic policy analysis”). See also Susan Tomaine, Comment, Troxel v. Granville: Protecting
Fundamental Parental Rights While Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50
CATH. U. L. REV. 731, 781 (2001) (proposing a presumption that favors parents in third-
party visitation statutes).
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Court’s reluctance to create new rights under the Due Process Clause, to
an intentional decision of the Court to leave the scope of the fundamental
right of parenting undefined, or the doctrine of abstention. However,
these reasons are insufficient to explain the problem.
Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court’s omission of guidance regarding
the appropriate level of scrutiny for the parental right cannot be the
Court’s goal given its role to clarify the law for the lower courts.88 Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of abstention cannot fully explain it,89 at least partly
because it would be in contravention of the function of the U.S. Supreme
Court to set appropriate levels of scrutiny.90 Finally, although the U.S.
Supreme Court is reluctant to create and expand new rights,91 the paren-
tal right is among the earliest established.92
One possible reason for the lack of an articulated level of scrutiny in-
sufficiently explored in the literature is that the parental right to the care,
custody, and control of a child is too complex for one level of scrutiny.
Indeed, not only are there many rights inherent to the parental right, but
it also spans both the public and private arenas, ranging from parenting at
the kitchen table to enrolling a child in a public school. These characteris-
tics of the parental right mean that it has eluded the simplest resolution,
which is the selection of one level of scrutiny.93 Instead, the lower courts
are inconsistently applying various levels of scrutiny because of the lack
of guidance, creating confusion. They are also excluding, without signifi-
88. “The Supreme Court’s struggle to clarify its position cannot be considered merely
accidental. Rather, the ambivalence that surrounds the jurisprudence regarding familial
rights is indicative of the Court’s reluctance to permit the familial sphere to become suffi-
ciently fortified such that it would prevent regular state intervention.” Scott J. Richard,
Note, Familia Interruptus: The Seventh Circuit’s Application of the Substantive Due Process
Right of Familial Relations, 3 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 140, 166 (2007).
89. See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 131, 170–71 (2009). The author explains that unlike some lower federal courts,
the Supreme Court has never fashioned a doctrine of wholesale abstention for domestic
relations. Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
517 U.S. 706 (1996), and Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976), the author notes that “[f]ederal courts have a ‘strict,’ ‘virtually unflagging’
duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by Congress” and “[a]bstention remains the ex-
ception [and] not the rule.” Further, the author suggests that “the existence of a federal
question should make federal courts more circumspect about abstention rather than less,”
stating that “in certain contexts the Supreme Court has deemed abstention inappropriate
because of the important constitutional claims alleged.” Id.
90. See Krotoszynski, Epitaphios, supra note 3.
91. Adam K. Ake, Comment, Unequal Rights: The Fourteenth Amendment and De
Facto Parentage, 81 WASH. L. REV. 787, 807 (2006). Ake highlights the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to create new rights under the Due Process Clause. One example Ake uses to
support the assertion that the Supreme Court is reluctant to create new rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment is the Court’s language in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
112 (1989). Ake, supra, at 807–08. In Michael H., “the plurality stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s [objective] is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside impor-
tant traditional values—not to enable courts to invent new ones.” Id. at 808. Therefore,
Ake suggests that “the Court has purposefully made it difficult to expand substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
92. See Garza, supra note 10, at 927.
93. See supra Part III.A.
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cant explanation, certain parental issues from the parental right.94
As illustrated by the split among the lower courts in parental right
cases, it is difficult to achieve consistency without a level of scrutiny.95
The simplest solution is for the U.S. Supreme Court to articulate the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny in its next parental right case. Yet, there is no
consensus on what that level of scrutiny should be. Although Justice
Thomas has suggested strict scrutiny,96 many of the lower courts utilize
less stringent review. Commentators have also split on whether strict
scrutiny would be applicable.
There are several reasons for the hesitancy to apply strict scrutiny to
parental right cases. First, much of the precedent on the parental right is a
product of its time.97 Justice Scalia noted that only a few U.S. Supreme
Court cases regarding the parental right relied on substantive due pro-
cess.98 “[Meyer and Pierce], read as parental rights cases, are often seen
as the only two remaining Lochner-era substantive due process cases that
are still good law and the Supreme Court invokes them as a starting point
in much of its modern substantive due process analysis.”99
Second, fundamental rights do not trigger strict scrutiny all the time.100
Indeed, much case law exists applying less than strict scrutiny to such
94. See supra Part II.
95. See William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Pa-
rental Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 182–83 (2000) (“But
while Troxel demonstrates the continuing significance of Meyer and Pierce, it also illus-
trates the continuing enigma of those decisions. Although Justice Kennedy correctly
pointed out in his dissent that all of the Justices seemed to agree that a ‘custodial parent
has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state, how best
to raise, nurture and educate the child,’ various members of the Court interpreted this right
in different ways. Both the four-justice plurality opinion and Justice Souter’s concurring
opinion relied heavily upon Meyer and Pierce to argue that parents have a powerful inter-
est in controlling their children’s personal associations. As Justice Souter acknowledged in
his concurring opinion, however, the Court’s decisions ‘have not set out exact metes and
bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child.’ Therefore, it
is not surprising, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence, in which he argued in
favor of strict scrutiny, that the opinions of the Court and of Justice Souter did not articu-
late a standard of review for legislation that interferes with the parental rights enunciated
by Meyer and Pierce.”) (footnotes omitted).
96. See supra Part II.A.
97. Lawrence, supra note 23, at 77 (asserting that the Court’s reasoning in Meyer was
routine to the Lochner era and stating that the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment
to a “limited and peripheral extent”).
98. See supra Part II.
99. Lawrence, supra note 23, at 71.
100. “Fundamental rights do not trigger strict scrutiny, at least not all of the time. In
fact, strict scrutiny—a standard of review that asks if a challenged law is the least restric-
tive means of achieving compelling government objectives—is actually applied quite rarely
in fundamental rights cases. Some fundamental rights trigger intermediate scrutiny, while
others are protected only by reasonableness or rational basis review. Other fundamental
rights are governed by categorical rules, with no formal ‘scrutiny’ or standard of review
whatsoever. In fact, only a small subset of fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny—and
even among those strict scrutiny is applied only occasionally. In short, the notion that gov-
ernment restrictions on fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny review is funda-
mentally wrong.” Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23
CONST. COMMENTARY 227, 227–28 (2006).
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rights.101 This very question arose after Obergefell, where it is possible
that the U.S. Supreme Court applied less than strict scrutiny despite not-
ing that the right to marry is one of the fundamental liberties.102 In addi-
tion, access to the courts is a fundamental right, but the court in one case
refused to conduct a strict scrutiny analysis of certain provisions of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, applying rational basis instead.103
Adam Winkler has noted in his empirical research that courts “tend to
reject another type of substantive due process infringement: restrictions
on parents’ rights to control their children’s upbringing.”104 In examining
strict scrutiny, Winkler noted that context matters. His methodology con-
sisted of “the results of a census of every strict scrutiny decision published
by the district, circuit, and Supreme courts between 1990 and 2003.”105
Other commentators have similarly noted the difficulty of applying
strict scrutiny in parental right cases.106 For example, David Meyer has
asserted that intermediate scrutiny should apply in these cases because
“the rigidity of traditional fundamental-rights analysis is ill-suited to the
task of mediating the complex and intersecting private and communal in-
terests which are often at stake in the family.”107 Furthermore, Meyer has
suggested that the Supreme Court acknowledge that intermediate scru-
tiny is the correct level of scrutiny.108
Although the Supreme Court has stated that parents have a fundamen-
tal right, Meyer pointed out that the Court is reluctant to embrace strict
scrutiny.109 According to Meyer, lower courts sometimes apply interme-
diate scrutiny, while “a handful . . . have applied strict scrutiny.”110 Thus,
Meyer emphasized the need for the Supreme Court to openly accept that
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate in order to secure family privacy
rights and avoid confusion.111
One method that courts have employed to avoid selecting a level of
scrutiny in parental right cases has been to entirely exclude certain paren-
101. See supra Part II.
102. See Ruthann Robson, Court Decides Same Sex Marriage Cases: DOMA (Windsor)
and Proposition 8 (Perry), CONST. L. PROF BLOG (June 26, 2013), http://lawprofes-
sors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/06/court-decides-same-sex-marriage-cases-proposition-8-
and-doma.html [https://perma.cc/P8RF-837N].
103. Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F. Supp. 2d 586, 602 (E.D. Pa. 1998), aff’d
sub nom. Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1999). In another case,
the court declined to apply strict scrutiny to a law disallowing certain classes of felons from
receiving private detective or security guard licenses even though “the right to hold specific
employment is a vital and constitutionally protected one.” Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp.
1077, 1079 (D.C. Conn. 1977). However, the court did not claim the right was fundamental,
but only vital and constitutionally protected. Id.
104. Winkler, Fatal in Theory, supra note 12, at 864.
105. Id. at 795.
106. For further background on strict scrutiny, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007). See also SHULMAN, supra note 37, at 3.
107. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 527
(2000).
108. Id. at 527.
109. Id. at 549. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
110. Meyer, supra note 107, at 547.
111. Id. at 577.
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tal issues from the right to the care, custody, and control of a child.112
However, in doing so, courts have seemed to draw arbitrary lines. It is
difficult to say that if an issue implicates a parent it does not trigger the
parental right, especially when it includes the care and control of a child.
Yet this is what courts have done.113
In sum, although commentators have for years called for the U.S. Su-
preme Court to simply set a level of scrutiny for the parental right, it has
not yet done so. If this is because the parental right is too complex, then it
should be unpacked to facilitate setting a level of scrutiny. In other
words, unbundling the parental right into its elements would allow a
more nuanced approach to the selection of a level of scrutiny based on
the exact parental issue at stake. For example, the protection of a parent’s
right to custody might be more compelling than the protection of a par-
ent’s decision to shield the child from contraceptives offered by the
school nurse’s office.114 Yet, the current law is complicated and incoher-
ent on these issues, allowing parental opt-out of a child’s sex education in
many states, but not requiring parental consent for other reproductive
decisions of the child.115
It may be that the complexity of the parental right precludes setting
only one level of scrutiny because different parental issues deserve differ-
ent levels of deference to the parent. If the parental right eludes setting
one level of scrutiny, then a framework for the parental right can help
organize judicial approaches to such cases, making them consistent and
more predictable. Indeed, selecting one level of scrutiny may be difficult
given the uniqueness of the parental right, resulting from the many roles
of a parent as well as the complexity of the parental right and its place in
both the public and private realms.
This Article facilitates a dynamic approach to selecting a level of scru-
tiny by offering two ways to view the parental right—as a bundle of rights
or as a sliding scale. These conceptions of the parental right both explain
and justify the current judicial use of various levels of scrutiny, but also
facilitate the selection of the appropriate level of scrutiny in a more con-
sistent and predicable manner.
112. See supra Part II, notes 65–67, 77 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. For a case on condom distribution at public schools, see Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606
N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding a “compelling state interest” necessary to
override parental rights in a dispute over condom distribution in the New York City
schools).
115. See Maya Manian, Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents, 81 MO. L. REV. 127,
139–40 (2016); see also Kelly Percival & Emily Sharpe, Sex Education in Schools, 13 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 425, 426–41 (2012) (reviewing the variations in state sex education policy).
However, sex-related issues are particularly complicated given that they are often at the
center of cultural disagreements in the United States. See, e.g., Jesse R. Merriam, Why
Don’t More Public Schools Teach Sex Education?: A Constitutional Explanation and Cri-
tique, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 539, 539 (2007).
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B. CONCEPTUALIZING THE PARENTAL RIGHT
This Article proposes two different ways to conceptualize the parental
right that facilitate setting a level of scrutiny for state interferences, but
they have similarities. The key similarity is that they both allow the level
of scrutiny to be adjusted depending on the burden placed on the essence
of parenthood, explaining and justifying the current approach while
bringing clarity, judicial economy, predictability, and consistency to this
area of family law. Any other resolution similarly needs to address the
challenges of setting the level of scrutiny for the parental right given its
complexity.
1. Sliding Scale—Varying the Level of Scrutiny
The sliding scale model of the parental right would envision the differ-
ent rights inherent to the care, custody, and control of a child on a sliding
scale.116 The rights that are core to parenthood would be at one end of
the scale, and those that are peripheral would be at the other. The level of
scrutiny would then heighten as the burden on the essence of parenthood
increases along the sliding scale. In other words, the closer the parental
issue is to the most important functions of parenthood, the more stringent
the review by the courts.
This approach has several virtues, among which is the flexibility of us-
ing various levels of scrutiny depending on the amount of deference to be
given to the parent.117 In other words, being closer to the essence of
116. In the equal protection context,
The sliding-scale method differs conceptually from the current three-tier
standard of review. The three-tier method attempts to pigeonhole rights as
either fundamental or nonfundamental. This rigid system does not take into
account the relative importance of the rights of those affected but only deter-
mines whether or not a right is fundamental. A sliding-scale approach does
not cast rights as either/or propositions, fundamental or nonfundamental. In-
stead, a sliding-scale approach weighs the right according to its relative im-
portance. Fundamental rights are still recognized but in addition so are other
non-fundamental rights. All nonfundamental rights are not automatically ac-
corded the lowest standard of review. Instead, vital, crucial, substantial, or
moderate rights are all given some varying form of heightened scrutiny de-
pending on the relative importance of the right.
Raffi S. Baroutjian, Note, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of Equal
Protection Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer
v. Evans, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1277, 1317 (1997) (footnotes omitted). “[E]ven the recently
developed case law in the Second Amendment area is beginning to take on a variation of a
quasi-sliding scale version of formal tiering.” Wright, supra note 25, at 182 n.78 (citing
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Borrowing from the Court’s
First Amendment doctrine, the rigor of this judicial review will depend on how close the
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden
on the right.”)).
117. “[A] sliding scale eliminates the discrete step-ups and step-downs of more tradi-
tional levels of scrutiny.” Wright, supra note 25, at 167. But see Winkler, Fatal in Theory,
supra note 12, at 797 (“While it remains true that the majority of laws subjected to strict
scrutiny fall and that the government typically faces an onerous task defending laws under
this standard, strict scrutiny is not nearly as deadly as generations of lawyers have been
taught.”).
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parenthood would make the parental right constitutionally more
fundamental.
The sliding scale approach does not require assigning an absolute level
of scrutiny to a particular sub-right but allows for fluid movement along a
scale. For example, it could better adjust to address a slight or unintended
infringement of rights close to the core of parenthood, as well as to a
more substantial and burdensome infringement on rights further from the
core.
The sliding scale approach does not require courts to exclude issues
from the parental right that implicate parents. Instead, courts could give
deference to the state while acknowledging the parental right by placing
it on the end of the sliding scale furthest from the essence of parenthood
and thus using rational basis review.
However, there are drawbacks to the sliding scale model. Notably, this
approach suffers from some of the problems of the current approach un-
less markers are defined along the scale to determine which rights lie
where. Indeed, while the two ends of the scale are easier to define be-
cause they are extreme, there will be grey areas along the sliding scale,
endangering the goals of transparency and certainty. The fluidity of rights
along the sliding scale may also harm predictability. Finally, this model of
the parental right also still speaks in generalities and groups, which may
hinder consistency.
2. Bundle of Rights—Assigning a Level of Scrutiny to Sub-Rights
Another model for the parental right is to view it as a bundle of rights
similar to the bundle of sticks in property parlance.118 Each right inherent
to the parental right to the care, custody, and control of a child would be
separated and assigned a particular level of scrutiny depending on how
close it is to the essence of parenthood. There are many rights in the
bundle, and each would have an individual level of scrutiny.
The essence of parenthood would be at the core of the bundle of rights,
and state laws seeking to restrict it would receive strict scrutiny. The non-
strict scrutiny sticks would be those on the periphery, straying from the
core of parenthood.
The criticisms lodged against the bundle of sticks in property law would
apply in the family law context as well, including that it is simply a loose
aggregate of rights.119 Additionally, as in the current approach, it can be
118. “For much of the twentieth century, legal academics conceptualized property as a
bundle of rights. The bundle-of-rights metaphor captures well the way in which ownership
interests can be divided over time, as in the case of present and future interests, and among
different people, as in the case of concurrent interests (e.g., joint tenancies) and common
interest communities (e.g., condominiums).” Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights
Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 58 (2013).
119. “The metaphor has come under sustained attack for its alleged implicit suggestion
that property lacks a stable core and comprises nothing more than a loosely assembled and
endlessly disaggregable pile of use rights.” Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1955, 1978–79 (2012).
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hard to determine which sticks belong in the bundle and what level of
scrutiny each should receive. Furthermore, there are more absolutes in
the bundle of rights model versus the sliding scale model of the parental
right—a sub-right is attached to one stick with one level of scrutiny, as
opposed to fluidly sliding between levels of scrutiny. Finally, this model
assumes that cases tend to have some uniquely best description, as op-
posed to conflicting possible descriptions.
Compared to the bundle of rights model, the sliding scale model has
the advantages of relative flexibility and similarity to the current ap-
proach. However, both models have advantages and disadvantages, but
are useful for introducing a framework that helps determine the appro-
priate level of scrutiny in parental right cases.
C. SELECTING A LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
Conceptualizing the parental right as either a sliding scale or a bundle
of rights facilitates a framework that can bring predictability and consis-
tency to selecting a level of scrutiny. However, both of these models have
a few commonalities worth identifying that help their effectiveness. Any
other potential framework may also need to integrate the characteristics
shared by these models to address the unique complexity of the parental
right.
A key commonality is that both models allow different levels of scru-
tiny to be applied in recognition that not all parental issues are equal in
weight, ranging from public school curricular preferences to the proce-
dures for removal of a child from the parent’s home. Thus, these pro-
posed models allow strict scrutiny for direct and intended restrictions on
the essence of parenthood and lesser scrutiny for merely incidental
restrictions.
To some extent, therefore, both of these models facilitate organic solu-
tions because the courts are already using different levels of scrutiny in
parental right cases.120 For example, while it is universally recognized that
children should live with their fit parents,121 parents often do not have a
choice to opt-out of the public school curriculum.122 The sliding scale
model, when compared to the bundle of sticks, is closer to how the courts
are currently varying the level of scrutiny depending on the parental is-
sue, which would ease the transition to this model.
The main benefit of understanding the parental right as either a sliding
scale or a bundle of rights is having a framework through which to envi-
sion the parental right in order to facilitate the coherent selection of a
level of scrutiny in such cases. In other words, if one level of scrutiny does
not suffice for the complexity of the parental right, then more than one
120. See supra Part II.
121. See infra Part III.C.
122. Noa Ben-Asher, The Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 365 (2012)
(“[F]amilies in the past four decades have typically failed when trying to opt out of pro-
grams and policies of public education.”).
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could be used more predictably and consistently by envisioning the pa-
rental right as consisting of several sub-rights. Additionally, these models
can recognize an intermediate level of scrutiny in these cases.123
Both models are also sensitive to the fact that the parental right spans
both the public and private spheres. Parental issues require less deference
to parenthood when they interact with society’s interests or the child’s
interests.124 Indeed, it is not only a parent who has an interest in the
child—it is also society that has an interest in having healthy and edu-
cated members.125
Before being imposed on a sliding scale or bundle of rights model, the
essence of parenthood and its related sub-rights must be defined. Indeed,
both models assume that different parental issues require different pro-
tection. For example, some require less protection because they are in-
consequential or only tangential to parenthood. Others are at the core of
parenthood and merit maximum protection. The gravity of each sub-right
and its relationship to the essence of parenthood must be examined.
Thus, the key to any model will be to break down the parental right
and to define its terms. Indeed, the definitions and breakdown of relevant
terms will drive the outcomes generated by either model. Breaking down
the parental right is similar to defining its terms because to break down
the right, a court must understand its terms. The courts have started to do
this already by carving out exceptions from the parental right,126 as well
as by noting that the right arises in different contexts.127
123. See supra Part II; notes 81, 110 and accompanying text; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197–98 (1976). See also Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After
Troxel v Granville, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 123 (2001) (“A strong argument can be
made that the plurality opinion [in Troxel] implicitly rejected both the rational-basis and
strict scrutiny options in favor of a form of intermediate scrutiny.”).
124. “When the state does seek to intervene, it brings the state’s right into direct con-
flict with the parents’ right. The line-drawing question then becomes one of how extensive
the parent’s right is, against the state’s competing interest to act on behalf of the child, and
on behalf of society.” David Pimentel, Protecting the Free-Range Kid: Recalibrating Par-
ents’ Rights and the Best Interest of the Child, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37 (2016). See also
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (noting that a person’s freedom must
sometimes be subordinated to the common welfare and is subject to the police power of
the state).
125. “Every eight seconds a baby is born in the United States. In that moment, a very
special relationship between parent and child is born. Numerous sources of law govern this
relationship, including state and federal law, and even the U.S. Constitution. As a result,
the relationship between parent and child is not simply between parent and child. Rather,
the state, with all of its power and authority, is also involved.” Elaine M. Chiu, The Culture
Differential in Parental Autonomy, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2008) (footnotes
omitted). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 87–88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[P]arents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and guiding their children,”
but “these interests have never been seen to be without limits” and “a parent’s interests in
a child must be balanced against the State’s long-recognized interests as parens patriae.”).
126. See supra Part II, notes 65–67, 77 and accompanying text.
127. “The sheer diversity of today’s opinions persuades me that the theory of
unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis
protection. A legal principle that . . . produce[s] such diverse outcomes in . . . [a] simple
case . . . is not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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There are already many questions regarding terminology in family law.
For example, the term “parent” has been expanding along with technol-
ogy.128 However, there are two separate sets of questions at issue regard-
ing the definition of parent: “who” is a parent129 and “what” is a parent,
i.e., what are the parent’s roles and obligations.130 Both terms cause con-
fusion for the lower courts, but this Article limits itself to the latter131 in
cases of minor children.132 These will have to be better addressed in for-
mulating a framework on the parental right.
In other words, it is not that the U.S. Supreme Court has not articu-
lated the level of scrutiny, but rather that the Court has left the scope of
the fundamental right of parenting undefined to some extent. While some
parenting issues and decisions fall within the scope of the fundamental
right, others do not.133 Fundamental due process analysis may be ill-
suited for such a broad area.134
Currently, there is no consistent definition of the parental right or its
128. See, e.g., Yehezkel Margalit, Bridging the Gap Between Intent and Status: A New
Framework for Modern Parentage, 15 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 1, 3–6 (2016).
129. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 249–50 (1983). “The U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly created a tiered, hierar-
chical structure of parental rights, and has consistently rejected assertions that adults in the
lower tier have rights on par with those in the upper tier—mothers, married fathers, and
adoptive parents.” Ake, supra note 91, at 810–11. See also Alessia Bell, Note, Public and
Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the Constitutional Rights of Family Members, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 231 (2001) (proposing “a psychosocial parenting doctrine for
resolving visitation disputes”).
130. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Writing for a plurality,
Justice O’Connor identified Granville’s asserted liberty interest as ‘the interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children,’ but left the scope of that right unde-
fined.”) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
131. For an excellent discussion of how the type of parent impacts the level of scrutiny,
see Ake, supra note 91, at 810–11. Ake suggests that the level of scrutiny applied to a case
is dependent on the tier into which the parent falls. Id. at 794–95. Ake states that upper-
tier parents are more likely to be afforded the fundamental right to the care, custody, and
control of their children. Id. at 790. Ake states that those in the lower tier have the stan-
dard of intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 801.
132. “A number of circuits are split on the issue of whether there exists a Fourteenth
Amendment due process right of a parent to associate with his or her adult child. . . . The
lower courts are reluctant to expand the unenumerated constitutional rights without clear
guidance from the Supreme Court.” Meir Weinberg, Note, The Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Right of Companionship Between a Parent and His or Her Adult Child: Exam-
ination of a Circuit Split, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 271 (2009).
133. See supra Part II.
134. See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1129–30 (2001). Meyer suggests that “[t]he daunting complexity of
family relationships commands special caution and flexibility in formulating any constitu-
tional rules of decision” and such complexity “signals an approach to family-privacy con-
troversies that is quite different from the rigid, heavy-handed scrutiny prescribed by
conventional fundamental rights doctrine.” Id. at 1146. Meyer remarks that the Court in
Troxel appeared to be more hesitant than usual to invade the province of state courts and
their ability to handle family law matters. Id. at 1153. Meyer proceeds to explain that as a
result the Court implicitly rejected strict scrutiny, suggesting that it was warranted because
strict scrutiny review is unfit for “[t]he almost infinite variety of family relationships.” Id. at
1150–51 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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elements.135 Given the difficulty of defining terms without precedent, it is
useful to set up narrower categories of the parental right to make it more
predictable. While it is usually the state legislatures that define terms, the
Supreme Court can use broad brushes to set up different categories
within the parental right, as it does in many areas of law.136 Any narrow-
ing of the parental right into categories will help its understanding more
than leaving it a broad category.137
There are ways to break down the parental right that are consistent
with the current case law, which would facilitate its adoption by the
courts. Although the right’s breakdown and definition can be set accord-
ing to public policy, another way to do so is to look at its components.
Breaking down the parental right into its three named components is rea-
sonable given the articulation of the three aspects of the right.
Specifically, there are three elements to the parental right: the child’s
care, custody, and control. Custody may be the clearest concept of the
three. Parents should continue to have the right to exercise child custody
as against third parties and the state, absent abuse or neglect.138 Indeed,
there is a universal understanding that children should live at home with
135. The U.S. Supreme Court language regarding it is broad. See, e.g., Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, we held that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right
of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and ‘to control the education of their
own.’”) (citation omitted).
136. See, e.g., Daniel J. Klein, The Integrity of Section 101: A “New and Useful” Test for
Patentable Subject Matter, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 287, 288 (2011) (review-
ing the categories established in patent law); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a
Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1003, 1010–11 (1993) (noting the use of categories in First Amendment
jurisprudence).
137. See supra Part II. “The Supreme Court has never been called upon to define the
precise boundaries of a parent’s right to control a child’s upbringing and education.” C.N.
v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005).
138. Billups v. Penn State Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 910 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758–59
(M.D. Pa. 2012) (“[A] government actor may constitutionally override parents’ rights to
the care, custody, and control of their children if he or she possesses ‘some reasonable and
articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is
in imminent danger of abuse.’”) (quoting Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth
Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997)). However,
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital in-
terest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If any-
thing, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a
more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy
weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair
procedures.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982). One district court determined that the
state has an interest in protecting children that “become[s] ‘compelling’ enough to sever
entirely the parent-child relationship only when the child is subjected to real physical or
emotional harm and less dramatic measures would be unavailing.” Roe v. Conn, 417 F.
Supp. 769, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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their parents.139 Thus, it is clear to assert that strict scrutiny should apply
to a state’s actions that restrict this type of parental right. The state must
not interfere with a parent’s custody of a child without a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and should use narrowly tailored means that are the
least restrictive for achieving its interest.
It is also easy to set custody at the core of parenthood because it sits
squarely in the private home realm.140 Issues like these at the core of
parenthood should be protected to the greatest extent. However, many
other parental issues implicate the child, other children, or society, and it
is then important to balance all of these parties, making it difficult to set a
strict level of scrutiny in these cases.
In parental right cases, courts and commentators have been relatively
reluctant to apply strict scrutiny—and strict scrutiny leaves the least op-
portunity for state interference—so it must be reserved for the most ex-
treme cases, such as the removal of children from the parents’ custody
into state or third-party care.141 The state could still remove children for
abuse and neglect even under the strictest level of scrutiny, as done
now.142 Thus, parental custody rights would be at the far end of the slid-
ing scale because they are at the core of parenthood, and they would be
at the core of the bundle of rights.
Care and control involve many parenting tasks. While parents make
numerous decisions regarding the care and control of a child by virtue of
living in the same household,143 the state may have reasons to become
139. See, e.g., In re McCullough, 366 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (“the policy
of [Michigan is] to keep children with their natural parents whenever possible”); Ready v.
Hughes, 846 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Waco 1985, no writ) (“the best atmosphere for [the]
mental, moral and emotional development of [a] child is [usually] with its natural parents,
and there is [a] strong presumption that a child’s foremost interest is usually best served by
keeping custody . . . with the natural parents”). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
652–53 (1972).
140. This is true in the context of state removal from the parents. See Carlson v. Wivell,
152 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Neb. 1967).
The state does not, of course, have unfettered latitude to remove children
from the care of their parents. The state’s power to interfere in its capacity as
parens patriae was first limited through the application of the substantive due
process clause in a series of landmark Supreme Court cases, beginning with
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters in the 1920s.
Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive,
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 141, 154
(2006) (footnotes omitted). On the contrary, in custody disputes between the parents
themselves, the child’s best interests will dictate. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmar-
riage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 75 (2016).
141. This is distinguished from the divorce setting, where both parents have an interest
in the custody of the child. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Bias in the Family: Race, Ethnic-
ity, and Culture in Custody Disputes, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 213 (2017). See also infra note
145.
142. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology into
Family Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 385, 392 (2009).
143. See, e.g., Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
123, 125 (1999) (“I know of no exhaustive listing of the set of parental rights we typically
associate with having full custody of children. The following rights, only some of which are
relevant to our present concern, are commonly assumed to be included in the set: the right
to physical possession of the child; the right to inculcate in the child one’s moral and ethical
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involved in the care and control of a child, and the courts would have to
allow a lower level of scrutiny for that intervention to occur. Specifically,
these reasons include protecting other children and the interests of
society.144
Care could be limited to health issues and visitation issues, the latter of
which creates a whole separate subfield.145 Decisions over the healthcare
of children no doubt pose difficult questions:146 while the parental right
protects parents, the state has to protect the child147 as well as other chil-
dren in society. Vaccination is a common example of this, with courts
balancing the parental right while protecting other children from commu-
nicable diseases.148 For such parental issues, intermediate scrutiny pro-
vides protection for parents while still allowing the state to restrict the
parental right when its important interests justify such intervention. Ac-
cordingly, these parental issues would occupy the midpoint of the sliding
scale and receive intermediate scrutiny in the bundle of rights model.
Control can mean control over the child’s education and being, creat-
ing the comprehensive category for all other issues beyond custody and
care.149 These are the least weighty issues of parenthood as compared to
standards, including the right to discipline the child; the right to control and manage a
minor child’s earnings and property; the right to have the child bear the parent’s name; the
right to prevent adoption of the child without the parents’ consent; the right to make deci-
sions concerning the medical treatment, education, religious training and other activities of
the minor child; and, the right to information necessary to exercise the above rights respon-
sibly.”) (footnote omitted).
144. See supra Part II.
145. There has been much state court litigation over the constitutionality of child cus-
tody and visitation laws. See, e.g., Zurek, All the King’s Horses and All the King’s Men: The
American Family After Troxel, the Parens Patriae Power of the State, a Mere Eggshell
Against the Fundamental Right of Parents to Arbitrate Custody Disputes, 27 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL’Y 357, 399–404 (2006) (discussing how state courts have grappled with the
Troxel decision and visitation). One problem with constitutionalizing the parental right is
that it provides an argument that both parents, upon separation, have an equal right to
custody as a due process matter. See, e.g., Urso v. Illinois, No. 04-CV-6056 (N.D. Ill., 2004,
Kennelly, J.) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
146. Lynn D. Wardle, Controversial Medical Treatments for Children: The Roles of Par-
ents and of the State, 49 FAM. L.Q. 509, 511–12 (2015) (noting “the conflict between the
constitutional rights of parents to provide their children with medical . . . treatment they
believe is needed, and the parens patriae interests of the state to regulate parenting activi-
ties in the best interests of children”).
147. SHULMAN, supra note 37, at 5 (discussing the state’s role and authority as parens
patriae).
148. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood
Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal,
63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 893 (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory
Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589 (2016).
149. For example, homeschooling is one issue that is implicated. See, e.g., Martha Al-
bertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights Over
Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 59 (2016); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsi-
bility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education. Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function
of a State.”) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)). However, consti-
tutional rights other than the parental right may protect it. See infra note 154 and accompa-
nying text.
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a loss of custody to a third party or the state, and include issues such as
whether public school students must wear a uniform—although they still
need protection because they remain in the purview of parenting. With
such less weighty parental matters, or when strong state interests accumu-
late, rational basis should suffice to protect parents.
This proposed approach resembles current judicial outcomes, but it
would provide more predictability and consistency by virtue of a general
framework. For example, the proposed approach yields the same out-
come as the current use of rational basis review by courts in cases related
to public school education, such as curriculum and uniforms.150 The U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that education “is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later profes-
sional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment.”151 Thus, when competing with the parental right, the state
interests may prevail.
This proposed approach also applies rational basis review to restric-
tions on the parental right to control the means of disciplining children, as
in many previous cases.152 However, this proposed approach would di-
verge from the juvenile curfew cases currently using intermediate scru-
tiny; nonetheless, intermediate scrutiny has not necessarily translated to
parent victories in these cases, making the actual outcome the same as
under rational basis review.153
Despite applying a lesser level of scrutiny to certain state restrictions
on the parental right, the courts have additional methods under the U.S.
Constitution to protect parents and children, such as the First Amend-
ment in cases challenging the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in
public school.154 There is also the child’s best interest to consider in many
150. See supra Part II; Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 273 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d,
514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that “parents do not have a fundamental liberty interest
that permits them to prescribe the curriculum for their children”).
151. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
152. See, e.g., Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 299 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff’d, 423 U.S. 907
(1975); Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 272–73 (5th Cir. 1988).
153. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1998). For background on
curfew laws, see Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws:
Sending Messages, but What Kind and to Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 26 (2006).
154. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa.
2003), aff’d in part sub nom. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004); Yoder, 406
U.S. at 213–14 (“[A] State’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is
not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and inter-
ests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.”) (citations omitted). See also Lawrence, supra note 23, at 73 (arguing that the
parental right is commonly combined with other constitutional claims); Yoder, 406 U.S. at
243–45 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Recent cases . . . have clearly held that the children
themselves have constitutionally protectible interests.”). But see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles,
The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 741 (2016) (“[T]he discussion of
children’s rights is still controversial and the methodology for advocating on behalf of chil-
dren contested.”); Maxine D. Goodman, The Obergefell Marriage Equality Decision, with
Its Emphasis on Human Dignity, and a Fundamental Right to Food Security, 13 HASTINGS
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family law matters.155
In sum, the various concepts inherent to the parental right to the care,
custody, and control of a child should be detangled from each other if
doing so would facilitate assigning a level of scrutiny. There is little doubt,
however, that the complicated nature of these concepts may be prevent-
ing a level of scrutiny from being set, causing confusion among the lower
courts.
Currently, the courts may be reluctant to select a level of scrutiny be-
cause of the packed nature of the parental right. There are many concepts
inherent to the notion of care, custody, and control that range from sex
education in public schools to a child’s removal from the parental home.
The only commonality is that these issues relate to the child. The gravity
of the child’s removal from the home to the state, however, is greater
than the parent’s interest in a particular dress code at the local public
school.156 Thus, courts must defer to parents in differing amounts de-
pending on the issue.
The world has grown more complicated, with many issues arising re-
lated to parenting. One level of scrutiny does not fit all parental issues,
making it difficult for the U.S. Supreme Court to provide guidance to the
lower courts on parental right cases. Conceptualizing the parental right as
a sliding scale or bundle of rights helps break down the parental right into
its elements, facilitating setting a level of scrutiny for the different sets of
issues that courts encounter regarding parenthood.
RACE & POVERTY L. J. 149, 197 (2016) (noting that the United States is one of only two
countries that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child). These additional
rights can help protect, for example, the parental decision to enroll children in religious
schools.
155. The “best interests of the child” standard often guides Anglo-American courts in
reaching decisions pertaining to children, such as in child custody cases. For a useful back-
ground on the best interests standard, see John C. Lore III, Protecting Abused, Neglected,
and Abandoned Children: A Proposal for Provisional Out-of-State Kinship Placements
Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
57, 64 n.23 (2006). But see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303–04 (1993) (“‘The best interests
of the child,’ a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible
criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody. But
it is not traditionally the sole criterion—much less the sole constitutional criterion—for
other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests conflict
in varying degrees with the interests of others.”) (emphasis in original).
The models of the parental right proposed in this Article might include another dimen-
sion, which would encompass the child’s interest and grow more important as the child
approaches the age of majority and as the question involved becomes more central to the
child’s identity, such as issues of abortion, contraception, First Amendment claims, and
health treatments. This dimension would become especially important when the child’s and
parents’ positions might conflict. See, e.g., Elk Grove v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2003);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
156. See, e.g., Keith Wiens, Comment, State v. Parent Termination of Parental Rights:
Contradictory Actions by the Ohio Legislature and the Ohio Supreme Court in 1996, 26
CAP. U. L. REV. 673, 673 (1997) (“A legal proceeding to permanently terminate a person’s
parental rights is one of the most drastic forms of governmental action known to our civil
justice system.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has not articulated a consistent level of scru-
tiny for interferences with the parental right to the care, custody, and
control of a child, despite using language that characterizes it as a funda-
mental right. As a result, the lower courts have split in their approaches,
causing inconsistency and unpredictability.
An undertheorized reason for the lack of guidance on the appropriate
level of scrutiny is that the parental right is too complex—spanning too
many different issues that variously burden the essence of parenthood—
to have one static level of scrutiny. If it is difficult to apply a level of
scrutiny because the right is complex, then it is important to break it
down into the major sub-rights that it entails. To do so, there are two
alternate ways to conceptualize the parental right—as a sliding scale or as
a bundle of rights—that can facilitate selecting a level of scrutiny by
breaking down the parental right into its component parts of care, cus-
tody, and control. This is the key to the commonalities between these two
models, which any other potential model might also need to incorporate
to work effectively.
Indeed, there are numerous issues currently falling into the parental
right—from minor school issues to the very custody of children. A dy-
namic approach to the selection of a level of scrutiny would consider the
issue at stake. Implementing a framework for it facilitates clarity, predict-
ability, and better protection of the parental right.
The lack of a level of scrutiny will not disappear without being ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. On the contrary, it will be increasingly felt
as parental roles expand and states respond with regulation.157 Indeed,
the courts are hearing a wider range of cases as parents encounter more
issues related to parenting and more state interferences, such as those
related to public school curriculum choices, procedures for the removal of
a child from the parental home, and the parental role in health deci-
sions.158 Thus, it is important to implement a framework for selecting the
level of scrutiny because the parental right is expanding each year, in-
creasing litigation.
As one of the oldest constitutional rights, the parental right has exper-
ienced a long period of change.159 Even the roles of family members in
157. See, e.g., Tracy Reilly, The “Spiritual Temperature” of Contemporary Popular Mu-
sic: An Alternative to the Legal Regulation of Death-Metal and Gangsta-Rap Lyrics, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 335, 383 (2009) (arguing that the state should not censor media
content even though parents may be too busy in the modern era to properly supervise their
children’s consumption of it); Parent’s Day, 1999, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,001 (July 23, 1999) (“The
challenges of parenthood have changed as our society has changed.”). See also Ben-Asher,
supra note 122, at 363 (noting an increase in “conflicts over families trying to ‘opt out’ of
various legal structures”).
158. See, e.g., Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parental Rights and Public Education, 59 W. EDUC.
L. REP. 271, 271 (1990) (“More basically, the enhanced role of the state in education paral-
lels the changing role of parents vis-a-vis their children and students vis-a-vis the school.”).
159. “As the legal system and society have changed, however, both the definitions and
roles of parents have changed.” Lindsay Mather, Comment, The “Other” Parent: Protect-
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society have changed over the decades.160 Family law has been criticized
for not keeping up with the modern family, and this criticism may be
especially true when it comes to clarifying the roles of the parent and
state in a growingly complex world. It will thus be important to better
define the parental right in the future, as well as the level of scrutiny for
state laws that restrict it.
ing the Rights of Noncustodial Parents in Emergency Removal Situations, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1189, 1189 (2011) (footnote omitted).
160. See, e.g., HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 5–6 (2002)
(discussing child labor and the historical role of children as financial contributors to the
family); Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding
Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557,
563 (2000) (noting the changing parental roles in the twentieth century); Sandi S. Varnado,
Inappropriate Parental Influence: A New App for Tort Law and Upgraded Relief for Alien-
ated Parents, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 148 n.218 (2011) (“[P]arental roles have changed.”).
